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CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-DIsMISSAL, WITHDRAWAL, OR ABANDONMENT-
WHETHER OR NOT APPELLATE COURT MAY VACATE ORDER DISMISSING
APPEAL, ENTERED AT REQUEST OF APPELLANT, AND REINSTATE APPEAL
ON DOCKET-An original petition for mandamus was filed in the Illi-
•nois Supreme Court in the recent case of People ex rel. Waite v. Bris-
tow' by which the petitioner sought to compel the judges of the Ap-
pellate Court for the Fourth District to expunge an order entered
therein reinstating the appeal which had been taken in a case in which
the petitioner had appeared as appellee. The petition alleged that a
certain appellant had served notice of appeal from a judgment ren-
dered by the Circuit Court of Pulaski County; that a transcript of
the record was duly filed in the Appellate Court and the cause
docketed; that it -Was subsequently discovered that the transcript con-
tained no final formal judgment order, although the minutes of the
trial judge were incorporated therein, for the reason that the clerk
had failed to write up the formal judgment; that a motion to dismiss
the appeal without prejudice was made by appellant and a motion to
dismiss was also made by appellee. The petition also charged that the
appellee's motion was denied while that of the appellant was granted
under an order which, at the same time allowed the withdrawal of the
record. 2 Petitioner further charged that the term of the Appellate Court
expired without any further action being taken but that, at the next en-
suing term, the appellant moved to vacate the order dismissing the appeal
and reinstate the cause because, in the meantime, a formal final judgment
had been entered on the records by the clerk of the trial court. That
motion also purported to request that leave to appeal be granted. The
appellee moved to strike such motion, but the Appellate Court granted
the appellant's request and entered a formal order vacating the pre-
vious action, reinstating the appeal and also purporting to grant leave to
appeal. It was this order which petitioner sought to have expunged. Issue
on such petition was made by answer and demurrer thereto,' and after
1391 Ill. 101, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 (1945). Gunn, J., wrote a dissentiAg opinion.
Stone, J., also dissented.
2 The order dismissing the appeal recited that the same was without prejudice:
391 Ill. 101 at 105, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at 548. The act of withdrawing the record is
usually not regarded as revoking a jurisdiction already conferred: Comrs. of High-
ways v. People ex rel. Walker, 100 Ill. 474 (1881).
3 The Supreme Court opinion states that "petitioner filed a demurrer" to the
answer: 391 Ill. 101 at 103, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at 547. While the Civil Practice Act
does not directly apply to mandamus proceedings, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 125,
it is made applicable by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 87, § 11. The latter statute also
states that the petitioner "may reply to the answer or present a motion directed
against" the same: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 87, § 4. The choice of terminology used
by the court is not strictly accurate.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
argument thereon, the Illinois Supreme Court awarded the peremptory
writ on the ground that the Appellate Court was without jurisdiction to
enter the order in question. It likewise held that such order could not
be said to amount to the granting of leave to appeal inasmuch as there
had been no proper request made for such relief.
Many instances exist in this state where the Illinois Supreme Court
has been called upon to exercise its original jurisdiction over mandamus
to supervise the activities of the lower courts of the state in order to in-
sure the proper performance of judicial duties.4 A proceeding of this
*character against the judges of an Appellate Court, however, is rather
rare,5 hence the instant case would be noteworthy from that fact alone.
It does, however, present certain principles which should be more widely
disseminated to prevent the future occurrence of the unfortunate events
which led to the pronouncement of that decision.
It is fundamental law that appeals, generally, lie only from final
judgments and decrees 6 and that a record on appeal which fails to dis-
close the existence of such a final order will provide no basis for the exer-
cise of appellate jurisdiction to review.7 On motion or even sua sponte,5
such a premature appeal will be dismissed by the appellate tribunal.
The mere oral pronouncement of a final judgment by the trial court,9
or the entry thereof in the judge's minutes 10 does not serve to present
a suitable final order. in the record sent up for review, for that record
should recite the formal judgment order noted by the clerk on the public
records of the court. 11
4 See J. A. Stanley and R. L. Severns, "The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois
Supreme Court," 22 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 169-96 (1944), particularly pp.
186-90.
5 Prior instances may be seen in the cases of People ex rel. Beadles v. Pam, 276
Il1. 181, 114 N. E. 504 (1916) ; People ex rel. Bender v. Davis. 365 Ill. 389, 6 N. E.
(2d) 643 (1937) ; People ex rel. Village of Westchester v. O'Connor, 378 Ill. 249,
38 N. E. (2d) 157 (1941).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 110, § 201. Appeal from certain interlocutory orders is
permitted by Section 202.
7 See, for example, Metzger v. Morley, 184 111. 81, 56 N. E. 299 (1900) ; Lynch v.
Spare Motor Wheel of America, 178 Ill. App. 510 (1913) ; Alton Lime and Cement
Co. v. Calvey, 41 Ill. App. 597 (1892).
8 The court has acted on its own motion even though neither appellant nor appel-
lee has raised the question: Thomas v. Ritholz, 310 Ill. App. 166, 33 N. E. (2d)
932 (1941).
9 Snook v. Shaw, 315 Ill. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW RuviEw 98.
10 Faulk v. Kellums, 54 Ill. 188 (1870) ; Fitzsimmons v. Munch, 74 Ill. App. 259
(1898).
11 Ashmore v. Skene Lead Co., 150 Ill. App. 381 (1909); Breese Coal & Mining
Co. v. Olney Electric L. & P. Co., 109 Ill. App. 539 (1903); Com'rs of Highways v.
Village of Rock Falls, 3 Ill. App. 464 (1879).
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For these reasons, the appellant here concerned wisely decided not
to urge its appeal after the same had been docketed for had it done so
the appeal would have, inevitably, been dismissed. Instead, it chose
to seek a voluntary dismissal so that no determination on the merits
could occur, intending 'to renew the appeal when a complete record could
be obtained. Therein lay the basic mistake for it is equally fundamental
that one who chooses to dismiss his action must be held to anticipate
the consequences of that choice and cannot move to have the dismissal
order vacated unless jurisdiction for that purpose has been expressly
reserved.12
By the entry of that order and the expiration of the term, the
Appellate Court lost jurisdiction unless the same could be re-acquired
in some other fashion. The Illinois Supreme Court has now indicated that
an appellant who is faced with the predicament that existed at this
stage of the appeal may find adequate remedy not in moving to dismiss
the appeal but rather by suggesting a diminution of the record and ap-
p:,ying for leave to supply the missing parts.'3 In that way, jurisdictioif
can be retained and proceedings stayed until the complete record is
before the higher court. 14
If the motion made by appellant was solely one to vacate the order
dismissing the appeal, then there can be no question but what the Ap-
pellate Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the prayer thereof and its
order reinstating the cause was necessarily void and mandamus would
lie to expunge the same.1 5 That motion could not operate as a petition
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis under Section 72 of the
12 See note in 23 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REvirw 327 to Fulton v. Yondorf, 324 Il.
App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d) 640 (1944). See also Bettenhausen v. Guenther, 388 InI. 487,
58 N. E. (2d) 550 (1945). It was argued, in the instant case, that an order of
dismissal "without prejudice" was equivalent to a reservation of jurisdiction for
the purpose of vacating such dismissal. The court held that the words "without
prejudice" were insufficient for this purpose: 391 Ill. 101 at 112, 62 N. E. (2d) 545
at 551.
13 391 Ill. 101 at 113, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at 551. This practice was sanctioned In
People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N. E. 214, Ann. Cas. 19120 451 (1911). See also
Wolf v. Hope, 210 Ill. 50, 70 N. U. 1082 (1904) ; Bergen v. Riggs, 40 Ill. 61 (1864) ;
Rubendall v. Tarbox, 200 I. App. 260 (1916), cert. den. 200 I. App. xii; Ross v.
Piano Steel Works, 34 Ill. App. 323 (1889). The suggestion must be promptly made
or It will be disregarded: Allen v. LeMoyne, 101 Ill. 655 (1882), where it was
made on petition for rehearing; McDonald v. Greenwood, 124 Ill. App. 163 (1906).
'4 The point was made that the appeal would still be Imperfect since the notice of
appeal would precede the entry of the judgment appealed from. That point was
answered by the statement that the failure of the clerk to enter judgment until
after notice of appeal had been served did not vitiate the notice since the entry of
the order was merely a ministerial act and did not affect the validity of the judg-
ment already pronounced: People ex rel. Holbrook v. Petit, 266 Ill. 628, 107 N. E.
830 (1915). See also Palmer v. Emery, 91 Ill. App. 207 (1900).
15 People ex rel. Crowe v. Fisher, 303 Ill. 430, 135 N. E. 751 (1922).
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Civil Practice Act 16 for the reason that it did not rest on errors of
fact unknown to the court at the time it entered the original order dis-
missing the appeal 17 as all of the facts were then well known. But an
appellant, despite the failure to secure review upon notice of appeal,
is still entitled to have the judgment reviewed within the time permitted
by law upon notice for leave to appeal and upon a showing of the absence
of culpable negligence.' s The motion filed in the instant case to vacate
the order dismissing the original appeal also prayed for leave to pros-
ecute an appeal, and the order entered thereon, in addition to other
things, granted such leave. 19
The majority of the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that such motion
was insufficient to comply with statutory requirements, hence could not
be made the basis for an order granting leave to appeal. 20 There is some
merit, however, to the argument of the dissenting judge that, at least in
this respect, the order of the Appellate Court was not void but merely
erroneous. 21 While notice of appeal is an essential jurisdictional require-
ment to appeals taken as a matter of right,22 there is little else about
an appeal that is jurisdictional. Most other questions involve compliance
with rules which may, in the exercise of discretion, be waived. Certainly,
in the case of granting leave to appeal, the statute expressly vests the
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 196.
17 Jerome v. 5019-21 Quincy Street Bldg. Corp., 385 Ill. 524, 53 N. E. (2d) 444
(1944). The petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis under the Civil
Practice Act is no broader in scope than the common law writ: Frank v. Salomon,
376 Il. 439, 34 N. E. (2d) 424 (1941), noted In 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 372,
reversing 298 I1. App. 548, 19 N. E. (2d) 147 (1939), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REvrEw 276. There is reason to doubt that such petition may be presented to
an appellate tribunal that possesses no original jurisdiction since it is primarily
designed for use in original proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to.
pass on this point: 391 Il1. 101 at 116, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at 552.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200. The earlier practice, before the 1943 amend-
ment, is illustrated by Spivey Bldg. Corp. v. Illinois Iowa Power Co., 375 Ill. 128,
30 N. E. (2d) 641 (1940), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 274.
1 391 Ill. 101 at 105, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at 548.
20 The motion appeared to be defective In that (1) no affidavit accompanied the
same to show the absence of culpable negligence in failing to file notice of appeal
within ninety days or failure to prosecute such appeal with diligence as required by
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200(1), and (2) no notice of appeal was presented
therewith as required by Rule 29: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.29. The suffi-
ciency of such an affidavit has been tested In Roy v. City of Springfield, 282 Ill.
App. 238 (1935), and Melsha v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 299 Ill. App. 157,
19 N. E. (2d) 753 (1939).
21 See dissenting opinion of Gunn, J., In 391 Ill. 101 at 126, 62 N. E. (2d) 545 at
556-7.
22 Francke v. Eadie, 373 Il. 500, 26 N. H. (2d) 853 (1940), noted In 18 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW REVIEw 416.
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appellate tribunals with a discretionary power,23 and the improper exer-
cise thereof would make the order erroneous but not void. It is true
that the litigant should, as a price for using the courts, be obliged to
comply with the rules thereof, It is also true that non-compliance there-
with may lead to the imposition of penalties, but there have been in-
stances in the past where the Illinois Supreme Court has tolerated in-
fractions of rules without going to the length of dismissing an appeal
or holding that such non-compliance amounted to a lack of jurisdiction
to proceed 24 all in keeping with the spirit of the Civil Practic Act.
25
While the Appellate Court had no right to reinstate the original appeal,
its action on the request for leave to appeal could be no worse than er-
roneous, hence not open to correction in the drastic fashion applied in
the instant case.2 6
T*le case does, however, serve as a warning that the appellant who
is faced with an insufficient record to support an appeal ought not to
apply for the dismissal of that appeal, if the deficiencies in the record
can be supplied, for the consequences of that action may be more serious
than he contemplates. He should, instead, see to it that the dismissal
order contains a reservation of jurisdiction to vacate the same, or else
present a separate petition for leave to appeal in the regular fashion.
23 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200(1), states: "The fact that appellant may
have filed a notice of appeal prior to the filing of his motion for leave to appeal
shall not deprive the reviewing court of the power in its discretion to grant leave
to appeal."
24 Durkin v. Hey, 376 Ill. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 463 (1941) ; Swain v. Hoberg, 380
Ill. 442, 44 N. E. (2d) 38 (1942) ; Harris v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 302 Ill. App.
310, 23 N. E. (2d) 793 (1939). Contra: Knecht v. Sincox, 376 Ill. 586, 35 N. E.
(2d) 68 (1941).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 128.
26 Subsequent to the order granting the peremptory writ in the instant case, the
original judgment debtor sought leave to appeal from the original judgment by
petition filed more than eighteen months after its rendition. Such petition was
stricken by the Appellate Court on the ground that it came too late. On writ of
error, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed: 392 Ill. 318, 64 N. E. (2d) 491 (1946).
